Late targets for variable remuneration as a liability risk for employers
In its judgement of 19 February 2025 (10 AZR 57/24), the BAG held that employees may be entitled to damages from their employer if the latter culpably breaches its contractual obligation to set targets for the employee in good time for a target period, the achievement of which is linked to the payment of variable remuneration, and if the subsequent setting of targets can no longer fulfil its motivational and incentive function.
Facts
- The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant as Head of Advertising since July 2016. According to his employment contract, he was entitled to an annual target salary of EUR 95,000 gross, consisting of a fixed salary of EUR 66,500 gross and a variable bonus component of EUR 28,500 gross. The variable targets were to be set annually by the line manager as part of an unilateral target-setting process.
- On 12 March 2019, a works agreement came into force which retroactively revised the remuneration model with effect from 1 January 2019. For managers such as the plaintiff, 70% of the variable remuneration consisted of company targets (e.g. EBITDA, turnover) and 30% of individual targets. According to the BV, the targets were to be set by 1 March of each year and discussed with the employee in advance.
- No individual targets were set for 2019. The company targets were first communicated to the plaintiff on 15 October 2019, with weightings and target ranges, i.e. after approximately three quarters of the target period had already elapsed.
- The defendant applied a flat rate of 142% (individual targets) and 37% (company targets) as the basis for determining the degree of target achievement and granted the plaintiff a bonus payment of EUR 15,586.55 gross. The plaintiff resigned on 30 November 2019 and claimed damages in the amount of EUR 16,035.94 gross, based on an estimated target achievement of 112.6% overall. He argued that the defendant was obliged to set the targets in a timely and proper manner. The defendant refused to pay on the grounds that the targets had been set in good time and were also in line with the principles of fairness, which is why a claim for damages due to late setting of targets was excluded. In particular, the plaintiff was aware of the relevant company figures from the presentation on 26 March 2019 and had been informed of the sales targets and EBITDA target on 16 April 2019.
- The BAG upheld the claim for damages in the amount requested by the plaintiff.
Reasons for the decision
- Legal obligation to set targets: The BAG clarified that variable remuneration is a single entitlement that requires the employer to set effective targets in a timely manner. The defendant had culpably breached this obligation by failing to set individual targets and by communicating the company targets late.
- Impossibility of setting targets at a later date: Subsequent determination of performance (Section 315 (3) s. 2 BGB) is excluded if a target can no longer fulfil its incentive purpose. Such impossibility (Section 275 BGB) exists in any case if, as here, a significant part of the target period (75%) has already passed.
- Fault and contributory fault: The defendant was unable to refute the legally presumed breach of duty (Section 280 (1) sentence 2 BGB). The plaintiff was not at fault (Section 254 BGB); he was not obliged to point out the target or to demand that it be set. The responsibility to take the initiative lies solely with the employer.
- Damages assessment pursuant to Section 287 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO): The BAG confirmed the assessment of the LAG, which had arrived at a total target achievement of 112.6% based on the average target achievement rate of 142% (individual targets) and a hypothetical 100% achievement of corporate targets. This resulted in a claim for EUR 31,622.49 gross, taking into account the bonus target remuneration of EUR 28,500 gross, of which the defendant still has to pay a sum of EUR 16,035.94 gross, after deducting the already paid EUR 15,586.55.
Consequences for practice
The BAG's decision is in line with its recent case law on employees' claims for damages in the event of late target setting in bonus systems linked to target agreements (see also our recent case law reviews in Monthly Dose 10/2024).
In systems of variable remuneration with performance targets, employers must ensure that targets are set in a timely, specific, and documented manner and communicated to the employee – especially if the targets are set unilaterally by the employer. Failure to do so may result in liability for damages. It is irrelevant whether the employee would have achieved the omitted targets in retrospect – the only decisive factor is the breach of the obligation to set targets. The duty to act lies exclusively with the employer; substitute targets (e.g. average values) are not permitted without a contractual basis. Subsequent judicial determination of targets is also excluded if the incentive effect is no longer achievable.
It is advisable to have clear and binding contractual provisions regarding the responsibility, timing, and form of target setting – and to ensure their proper implementation.